We present an infrastructure for flexible and secure access to a group of distributed services in a nomadic computing environment, wherein users access local services from their mobile, wirelessly connected devices. We describe a secure 'hand-off' protocol, which allows a user to register with a single service that 'hands off' authorization to access a subset of the services. Our protocol helps maintain the user's privacy. It allows the services (which may be implemented on simple appliances) and the user's mobile device to have modest resources: services do not have to be online to any party except the user's device and the storage and communication requirements are minimal. In addition to the hand-off protocol, the paper presents a model for authorization hand-off and describes related research and technologies.
INTRODUCTION
We present an infrastructure for flexible and secure access to a group of distributed services in a nomadic computing environment. This work is part of the CoolTown project [1] , which is investigating 'nomadic' computing systems: ones in which users, carrying wirelessly connected devices, enter places and use local services associated with those places. The services may be implemented and provided locally by appliances in the place, such as printers, data projectors and soft-drink dispensers.
Or they may be local only in the sense that their functionality is related to the location, such as a place-specific information service. Services may be implemented elsewhere but made accessible through physical interfaces in the place such as CoolTown's short-range infrared beacons [1] , which emit service addresses for capture by local clients.
We are interested in secure hand-off protocols that facilitate a nomadic user's access to place-specific services. In particular, we are interested in the case that those services are distributed throughout a large area in such a way that they are offline from any central point of administration or control. In nomadic computing, there may be a large number of simple appliances and other services and the cost of authorization mechanisms is an important factor, especially on simple appliances. Some of them simply do not have the necessary resources to run an authorization policy engine by themselves. Even if they do, the cost of keeping the authorization policy consistent on multiple services may be prohibitive. Therefore, in many cases, we need an authorization infrastructure in which there is a centralised authorization policy engine where all the authorization decisions are made.
For example, in Hotel Nomad, all the appliances in a conference room, such as a projector, a printer and a video conferencing facility, together with a service that provides information about local facilities, form a collection under one administration. A conference room manager will make authorization decisions for using those services based on, e.g., whether they have been paid for. The conference room manager or his computerized proxy serves as the centralised authorization policy engine.
Other examples are where a real-estate agent gives a user the right to gain entrance through electronic locks to a selection of homes, or a holiday agent gives the user the right to gain entrance to a selection of chalets and, in each case, use services within those places.
A major difficulty in implementing an authorization infrastructure in a nomadic computing environment is that we cannot assume that the nomadic user or those simple services will have online connections to the centralised authorization policy engine. For example, in the Hotel Nomad, all service accesses take place from the user's handheld device over a short-range wireless technology such as Bluetooth. A hotel guest may not be able to talk to the conference room manager at the time he wants to use the conference room projector. Nor can the manager control the projector remotely, if that only has a Bluetooth connection. This means we cannot use existing authorization solutions for distributed networks, such as OSF DCE [6] or SESAME [5, 7] .
In a nomadic computing environment, there is a need for a 'handoff' protocol such that authorization information can be given to a Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. nomadic user beforehand and verified by the local services offline. For example, a guest at Hotel Nomad who requires the use of conference room services and has paid for them may be given appropriate authorization credentials, e.g. at the hotel lobby when he checks in. Those credentials can be stored on his PDA (personal digital assistant), mobile phone or other portable device, and can be used to obtain access to those conference room services that he had paid for. The conference room services should be able to verify those credentials locally.
Any implementation of such an authorization infrastructure must be efficient in terms of both storing credentials and verifying credentials due to the computational and storage limitations of mobile devices and simple appliances. What complicates the problem is that there may be a large number of services and it is generally impossible to predict which services the user will access or in which order. Moreover, different users may be entitled to access different sets of services; those sets may be particular to each user, so we cannot assume a small number of generic sets. All this means the credentials have to be short and yet flexible enough for arbitrary access patterns.
In addition, it should be possible for the nomadic user to remain anonymous (if desired) when using the authorization service. A nomadic user who has anonymously established a relationship with a place such as a hotel should not be forced to expose their true identity when they obtain or use their credentials for the place's services.
Moreover, it is desirable that a service cannot learn whether its users have the right to access other services. This is based on the principle of 'need-to-know'. For example, a handheld device that establishes the right of its user to negotiate on behalf of her company, Acme, when presented at a potential partner's offices should not divulge the identities of Acme's other potential partners.
Our contributions in this paper include a model that specifies an authorization service for a nomadic computing system that satisfies the above requirements (Section 3). We give two versions of a hand-off protocol (Section 4) which implement the model efficiently with respect to time, storage and communication load, but which make different trade-offs between processing requirements and security. Section 2 discusses related research efforts. Section 5 concludes.
RELATED WORK
Some of the earliest work on authorization in distributed systems includes Grapevine [4] where end-servers query registration servers to determine whether a client is a member of a particular group. A similar approach is employed in Sun's Yellow Pages where centrally maintained files such as /etc/group are consulted for authorization purposes. In both cases, although authorization decisions are made locally, the local server has to obtain authorization data online from a remote server. The Kerberos authorization model for distributed systems is based on the principle that each service knows best who its users should be and what form of authorization is appropriate, so each service manages its own authorization information [2] . The goal of Kerberos authentication is to allow different services to implement different authorization models, and to allow those authorization models to assume that authentication of user identities is reliable. Therefore, each service must determine authorization solely on the basis of the client's identity carried in the service ticket, which means each service must be configured with the identity of all possible users. This leads to the management overheads of tracking down and modifying authorization entries for a stream of new and often temporary users.
The SESAME project [5, 7] extends the Kerberos authentication system and defines a scheme for securely propagating principals' privileges, including roles and groups, from clients to application servers in order to reduce the authorization management overhead at application servers. Fairthorne [6] discusses how the SESAME mechanism for secure transmission of privilege can be incorporated into an OSF DCE environment. However, both SESAME and OSF DCE employ online security servers as a direct result of extending Kerberos.
Several other works proposed off-line authorization solutions, such as delegation certificates in the Digital Distributed System Security Architecture [13, 14] , the cascaded authentication mechanism by Sollins [12] , proxy-based authorization by Neuman [9] and by Trostle and Neuman [11] , and authorization certificates by Woo and Lam [15, 16] .
Those solutions are geared toward authenticated delegation in distributed systems and are not suitable for our nomadic computing model. In authenticated delegation, the focus is on passing access rights from the client to the intermediary. When the client identifier is used in a delegation certificate, it is assumed that the identity of the client is already stored on end-servers' access control lists (ACLs). That is problematic for our target systems, as we stated above. When a client's capability rather than identity is used in a delegation certificate, the end-server only needs to verify the authenticity of the capability without the need to maintain an ACL. However, in existing systems the capabilities are usually end-server specific. The issues of generating compact capabilities that can be used on a large number of end-servers and in a privacy-preserving way have not received much attention.
A quite different approach that resembles our problem is secure multicast group membership. If we view Lobby L as a group controller in a multicast group and services as group members, the user registration phase (not the user access phase) of our off-line hand-off problem becomes similar to the multiple-leave problem for closed multicast groups. When some members leave a multicast group, the group controller has to inform the rest of the members in the group and give them a new group key (which they use for secure communication). If we think of S as the original multicast group and S U as the new multicast group after the leave operation, the same protocol used for group key updating can be used to inform the subgroup S U ⊆ S of services that the user U who is contacting them is authorized to access their services. In this view, the user serves as the communication medium for multicast, though in an asynchronous way, i.e., the user's accesses are viewed as communicating the group controller's message to group members.
Among various secure multicast protocols, those applicable to our problem are centralized approaches that can exclude a subset k of members [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] . From our perspective, those schemes are not very efficient in terms of transmission overhead when k is either very large (O(k log n)) or very small (O(m log m), where m = n− k). The problem of secure multicast group membership and our hand-off problem have different threat models and purposes. In the secure multicast group membership problem, the purpose is transmitting a new group communication key to the remaining subgroup of members while preventing leaving group members from getting the new group key. In our hand-off protocol, the emphasis is on identifying the new group in a secure and privacy-preserving way without the need to distribute a new key. Hence, our hand-off problem can be seen as a simpler problem of identifying the privileged group, i.e., the subgroup S U ⊆ S that the nomadic user is authorized to access. Ideally, we only need 1 bit of information to represent whether a service is in S U or not. Hence, our problem should have a more efficient solution than secure multicast in terms of transmission overheads and storage requirement at group members (services).
Broadcast encryption schemes [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] are similar in their goals to the user registration phase of our hand-off problem. Broadcast encryption schemes define methods for encrypting content so that only privileged users are able to recover the content from the broadcast. Correspondingly, in the hand-off problem only certain services are 'privileged' by the Lobby to provide their services to the user.
A main feature of work on such schemes is that there is a trade-off between the transmission length and the number of keys stored in the receivers. Either the transmission will be very long or a prohibitive number of keys needs to be stored in the receivers [30] .
As with secure multicast group membership, one of the central goals of broadcast encryption is the secrecy (and/or integrity) of the messages (or broadcast encryption key). Our secure hand-off protocol is a narrower problem that is only concerned with the secrecy and integrity of the receivers' identities.
MODEL
Suppose there are n services s i , i=1…n, in a nomadic computing environment. These services form a service group S, i.e., |S| = n. In addition, there is a distinguished service L called "Lobby". Lobby L maintains a central authorization policy engine for all services in S. A user U should first register with Lobby L before he/she can use the services in the service group. Registration does not necessarily involve disclosure of U's true identity. Lobby L will use the authorization policy engine to derive a subset S U ⊆ S of services that user U can access. Our task is to design an off-line authorization infrastructure that Lobby L can use to enable user U to access any service s ∈ S U securely and efficiently later on.
It is an important requirement that S may change, by adding or removing services, at any time and without affecting the existing set-up for other services. There may be thousands of services in our nomadic computing environment and new services are constantly added or old services removed. It would be economically prohibitive if every time we add or remove a service we have to change the set-up of the rest of the services, such as the keys stored on those services. However, we assume that any subset S U ⊆ S of services that user U can access is fixed once it has been defined. In our trust model, Lobby L is trusted to behave correctly. Services are also trusted and behave independently. The operational model of our off-line authorization protocol has the following three phases.
Set-up phase During the Set-up Phase, we assume Lobby L can communicate securely with each service s i ∈ S, i=1…n, and exchange whatever data is necessary.
User registration phase During the user registration phase, Lobby L should use the central authorization policy engine to obtain a list of services that user U is entitled to access. For example, the list could be a function of the user's identity or the payment made by an anonymous user. Exactly how Lobby L does this is outside the scope of this work. Suppose that Lobby L has found out that user U is entitled to access a subset S U ⊆ S of services. Lobby L then generates and gives to user U some credential C U based on S U . User U stores C U on his mobile device such as a PDA.
User access phase When user U later wants to use a service s ∈ S U , user U uses credential C U to convince s that U is authorized to access it. A major constraint is that neither U nor s is able to contact Lobby L at the User Access Phase. The verification has to be done off-line.
In terms of security, we want to achieve the following properties.
• Every s ∈ S can verify whether s ∈ S U , i.e., s can verify if U is authorized to access s's service.
• User U can verify whether s ∈ S, i.e., user U can verify if the service he/she is talking to is from service group S.
• No other user U' can access any s ∈ S U as U without colluding with U.
•
No service s ∈ S can tell if another service s' ∈ S U.
One solution is to give each service its own key and compute one credential for each service belonging to S U . But this requires n credentials to be stored on a user's mobile device where n may be large. Another simple solution is to provide every possible subset of services with a key and give every service the keys corresponding to the subsets it belongs to. This requires every service to store 2 n-1 keys, which scales even more poorly for large values of n.
In our nomadic computing environment, both storage and communication capacity at appliances and the user's mobile device are limited. The most stringent constraints are the storage space at users' mobile devices and wireless network activity costs. Hence, our solution is geared toward minimizing the size of credential C U . In doing so, we also minimize the communication complexity between users' mobile devices and services. Storage space at simple appliances could also be very limited. Therefore, we will also pay attention to the storage requirements at services. As to computational power, it is reasonable to assume that user's mobile devices are at least capable of running symmetric key algorithms and services are at least capable of verifying digital signatures.
THE HAND-OFF PROTOCOL
In this section, we obtain our off-line hand-off protocols by integrating a technique called "secret sets" with techniques from authenticated delegation. The first subsection describes secret sets. The remaining subsections present two versions of the handoff protocol: one for services and devices that are capable of computing public-key algorithms, and another, mostly symmetrickey based protocol for those that are not so capable.
Secret sets
The first problem we tackle is that of identifying the selected subset S U . We choose to use secret sets as our set identification method. Secret sets prevent one service from learning whether the user is also authorized to access another service. Moreover, the size of secret sets is nearly optimal. If nothing is known about the selected subset S U , the transmission has to be sufficiently long to uniquely identify the selected subset S U . Thus, in general, simply representing a subset S U ⊆ S requires |S| bits.
Molva and Tsudik [32] introduced the notion of a secret set -a basic construct for communication with groups of mutually suspicious entities. A set is secret if any entity can test its membership in the set but can determine neither the other set members nor the cardinality of the set. One of the more efficient constructions of secret sets is using bit vectors. The authors reason that the total amount of information needed to represent a secret set equals the cardinality of that set, i.e., the number of members therein. However, the difficulty in actually reducing the representation of a secret set S U to m = | S U | bits is the need to label them somehow. It is easy to see that simply generating a bit vector of length m (m < n = |S|) will result in confusion since a potential member has no means to determine the correct bit position (i.e., the bit it should process). Based on the above, the authors conjectured that the minimum length for a bit vector representation of a secret set is the number of all possible members -the cardinality of S.
Secret sets based on symmetric key method
Assuming that a group controller shares a secret symmetric key with every member in the group S (|S| = n), the secret set can be computed as follows. We denote the shared secret key with group member q by K q . The group controller first generates a random number b then sets the q-th bit of the n-bit vector V to:
Where K q {b} denotes the encryption of b with key K q and MSB(y) denotes the leftmost (most significant) bit of y.
The secret set is (V, b) and its length is (n + log b) bits.
Secret sets based on Diffie-Hellman method
Alternatively, if each group member has a Diffie-Hellman key and pre-distributes the public exponent to the group controller, the secret set can be generated as follows. Suppose group member q's Diffie-Hellman public exponent is g Kq mod P (where g is the base, K q is the private key and P is a large prime, P -1 being the group order.) The group controller first generates a random number b then sets the q-th bit of the n-bit vector V to:
The resulting secret set is (V, g b (mod P)) and its length is (n + log P) bits.
Public-key version
Here we present our protocol for services and devices that are capable of computing public-key algorithms.
Set-up phase
Suppose there is a group S of services s i , i=1…n.
1. Lobby L generates for itself a signature key SigKey.
2. For each service s i , Lobby L generates a public-key pair (Pk i ,Sk i ) where Pk i is the public-key and Sk i is the private key, and computes a certificate Cert i by signing PK i using SigKey.
3. Lobby L generates a master key K M , which it keeps secret, and derives a shared secret key with each service s i as follows [31] .
where HASH() can be any secure hash function, such as SHA1. 4 . Each s i then receives the following from L over a secure out-of-band channel:
User registration phase
When a nomadic user U comes to register at the Lobby L, L uses the authorization policy engine to obtain the set S U of services that user U is authorized to access. Lobby L then does the following.
1. Lobby L randomly chooses a number b, and computes a secret set (V, b) using the symmetric key method (with keys K i from step 3 above).
2. Lobby L randomly chooses a public-key pair (Pk u , Sk u ) for U. 4. Lobby L gives to user U the following in a secure way.
User U keeps Sk u to himself and forwards credential C U to services when he requires access. Since each service checks a unique bit in the bit vector V to find out authorization information independently, adding or removing a service will not affect other services. The size of vector V simply grows linearly with the number of services. In principle, those bits in vector V corresponding to removed services could be reused by new services. However, that would entail synchronisation so that all credentials giving access to the removed services had been obsoleted (e.g. credentials could be issued with secure expiry times)
User access phase
The storage requirements at both Lobby L and the services are very small. The size of credential C U is n bits plus a small constant (about 150 bytes if using 512-bit RSA).
If the services are capable of performing Diffie-Hellman key exchange, we can assign each service a Diffie-Hellman key and generate the vector V using the Diffie-Hellman method. The size of credential C U is similar to that using the symmetric key method.
Using the Diffie-Hellman method provides the added advantage that any service can potentially become a Lobby if it has access to the authorization policy engine, without the need to store pairwise keys at the services.
Symmetric-key version
If the services and user devices are not capable of performing public-key authentication, the following symmetric-key based protocol can be used. It meets the requirements of Section 3 although it is weaker in that it is susceptible if the target services are compromised. Note that we still assume that the services can verify digital signatures.
Set-up phase
2. Lobby L generates a (symmetric) group key K G , shared between L and the members of S.
User registration phase
When a nomadic user U comes to register at the Lobby L, L uses the authorization policy engine to obtain the set S U of services that user U is authorized to access. Lobby L then does the following. Only a legitimate service s ∈ S can decrypt the credential C U and retrieve its own authorization information from the secret set.
Since the secret set is digitally signed by Lobby L, all the legitimate services s ∈ S can be assured that the retrieved authorization information is authentic. After decrypting the credential C U, a legitimate service s ∈ S also obtains an authentication key K U to be used for mutual authentication with the requesting user. Since only the intended user U can obtain a copy of K U from Lobby L and user U is never supposed to give out K U , the mutual authentication makes sure that no other user U' can access the service and that user U is contacting a legitimate service s ∈ S. However, compared with the public-key version, security in the symmetric key version is weakened. An attacker that compromises a service can learn both the group key K G (enabling it to install spoof members of S) and users' secret keys (enabling it to impersonate users).
CONCLUSION
We have described a secure hand-off authorization protocol designed for nomadic computing systems. In such systems, users access a selection of potentially many services. Users are able to obtain authorization by first receiving a credential from a 'Lobby' service. We have chosen a name that is suggestive of a good location for the service in a place such as a building or a hotel. But it may be placed at any secure point where users can be expected to pass conveniently.
The services in a nomadic computing environment may be provided by relatively simple appliances. In recognition of this, our protocol allows services to be offline from any point of administration at the time of user authorization. Our protocol also has a storage requirement at the services that is constant and modest. It has a storage requirement at the user's device and a message size requirement that is also modest: n bits (where n is the total number of services) plus a small amount.
The protocol enables users to maintain their privacy by limiting the information held at services on a 'need-to-know' basis. Services do not store user identifiers and no service can tell whether a given user has access to any other member of the service group.
Our protocol gives authorization for a set of services that is fixed at the time of user registration, whereas in some cases it may be desirable to give users access to a set of services that is only logically identified when the user registers and whose membership may change at run-time. In particular, we do not provide a mechanism for revoking access to particular services in this model. However, it would be possible to insert an expiry time securely into the certificates issued to users, which can be checked by individual services in the user access phase.
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